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ABSTRACT 
 
Real-time information technology facilitates more 
efficient channels of communication. As communication 
becomes nearly instantaneous and further reaching, it 
seems probable that more expression will fall within the 
scope of cyberharassment and cyberstalking laws. 
Attorneys who represent clients indicted on such criminal 
charges need to familiarize themselves with possible 
defenses. This Article suggests invoking the overbreadth 
doctrine to exonerate a client who is charged with violating 
the federal cyberstalking statute. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Twitter is a real-time information network that allows people to 
receive and send news and information instantly.2 These 
dispatches are termed “tweets” and are limited to 140 characters in 
length.3 Persons with Twitter accounts may elect to receive tweets 
from other account holders.4 This is known as “following” and 
effectively allows a user to subscribe to select releases of 
information.5 Tweets are public but users can also send private 
messages amongst themselves.6  
Twitter is a global phenomenon that provides its service in over 
twenty different languages and is expected to have over one billion 
registered users by the end of 2013.7 With such an explosion in 
use, people may increasingly rely upon the legal system as 
recourse to halting harassment and stalking conducted through 
tweets. As with other forms of speech, one may incur criminal 
liability through the use of Twitter. Indeed, tweets have fallen and 
will continue to fall within the scope of state and federal 
cyberstalking statutes.8 
2 https://twitter.com/about (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Dominic Rushe, Icelandic MP Fights US Demand for her Twitter 
Account Details, THE GUARD. (Jan. 8, 2011). 
7 https://twitter.com/about (last visited Oct. 22, 2012); Claire Miller & 
Brad Stone, Hacker Exposes Private Twitter Documents, BITS (July 15, 2009). 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Sayer, Nos. 2:11-CR-113-DBH, 2:11-CR-47-
DBH, 2012 WL 1714746 (D. Me. May 15, 2012); Johnson v. Arlotta, No. 27-
cv-10-21534 (D. Minn. Dec. 12, 2011) (unpublished). 
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Interstate communication through an Internet service like 
Twitter may implicate on such statute in particular: the federal 
cyberstalking statute. When this occurs, substantial First 
Amendment issues may come into play. Subsection A of this 
Article discusses the federal cyberstalking statute in further detail. 
Section I provides a quick First Amendment refresher. Section II 
provides examples of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine as 
a potential defense to the cyberstalking statute by examining two 
cases involving the use of Twitter. 
 
I. TWITTER AND FEDERAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY  
 
In response to the growing number of crimes against women, 
Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”).9 
As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed in United States v. 
Page,10 Congress recognized the severe toll that such crimes 
impose upon society. VAWA provides, inter alia, funding for the 
investigation and prosecution of violent crimes against women. 
Congress reauthorized VAWA in 2000, 2005,11 and 2013.12  
 
A. The Cyberstalking Statute 
 
In 1996, Congress passed the original interstate stalking 
statute—codifed as 18 U.S.C. § 2261A—as part of VAWA.13 The 
statute criminalized the of use of the postal service, or any channel 
of interstate commerce, to engage in a course of conduct that 
purposefully placed another person in reasonable fear of death or 
serious injury.14  
The rise of the Internet created a new medium for stalking 
behavior, and stalking became more common than ever before. 
According to Department of Justice statistics, victim reports of 
9 Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1069(a), 110 Stat. 2422, 2655 (1996). 
10 167 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 1999). 
11 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006). 
12 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
13 See Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1069(a), 110 Stat. 2422, 2655 (1996). 
14 Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1107(b)(1), 114 Stat. 1464, 1498 (2000); see, e.g., 
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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stalking increased from 1.4 million in 1998 to 3.4 million in 
2009.15 In response, Congress amended § 2261A in 2006, 
broadening the reach of the statute to encompass stalking behavior 
conducted through Internet computer services.16 Congress also 
criminalized courses of conduct perpetrated with the intent to 
harass.17 To violate the statute, the alleged cyberharassment need 
not cause a reasonable fear of death or serious injury, as was 
required under the original law. Instead, purposeful conduct that 
leads to another’s substantial emotional distress is now sufficient 
to violate § 2261A.18  
By lowering the threshold from purposeful conduct that leads 
to emotional distress, i.e., intent to harass, Congress has broadened 
the cyberstalking statute to ensnare simple expression that may be 
subjectively understood as purposeful conduct meant to harass. 
Consequently, a defense that relies upon the protections of the First 
Amendment may be compelling.  
 
B. Applicable First Amendment Doctrine 
 
The First Amendment issues involved in raising a cyberstalking 
defense include the level of review, the tension between conduct 
and speech, the captive audience doctrine, the distinction between 
public and private speech, and the nature of facial and as-applied 
challenges. 
 
1. Standard of Review 
 
The standard of review for laws restricting speech varies.19 
Courts often employ the term “heightened scrutiny” in reviewing 
15 Melvin Huang, Keeping Stalkers at Bay In Texas, 15 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 
53, 55 (2009). 
16 Pub. L. No. 109–162, § 114(a), 119 Stat. 2690, 2987 (2006) (making it a 
crime “to kill, injure, harass, or place under surveillance with intent to kill, 
injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial emotional distress to a person 
in another state or tribal jurisdiction or within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States . . . .”). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 See, e.g., DAVID S. SCHWARTZ & LORI A. RINGHAND, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 936 (2012). 
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content-based restrictions on speech.20 Laws that restrict speech 
based on content deserve special scrutiny because such laws act as 
prior restraints, in effect, chilling freedom of expression—a 
constitutionally guaranteed right.21  
Although freedom of expression is not unlimited, even content-
neutral regulations must pass intermediate scrutiny.22 For example, 
emotionally distressing speech may be entitled to “special 
protection” under the First Amendment.23 This is important to note 
when considering the broad applications of the cyberstalking 
statute. 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the justification or the 
purpose of the statute will control whether such restrictions are 
content-based.24 If a law restricts speech due to its content, a court 
will then determine whether the speech falls within the narrow 
exceptions to First Amendment Protection: obscenity,25 
defamation,26 fraud,27 incitement,28 true threats,29 or speech 
integral to criminal conduct.30 If speech falls within these 
20 United States v. Bell, 303 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Byrne v. 
Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
22 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 3776–77 (1968). Even 
though the law at issue in O’Brien did not restrict speech based on content, the 
Court nevertheless asked whether the government could establish that: (1) the 
law was within the constitutional power of the Government, (2) it furthered an 
important or substantial governmental interest, (3) the governmental interest was 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) that the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms was no greater than required to 
further that interest. 
23 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (“[If such] speech was at 
a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special 
protection’ under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply 
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”). 
24 RODNEY A. SMOLLER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:5 (1989) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
25 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
26 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–55 (1952). 
27 Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 752 (1976). 
28 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam). 
29 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).  
30 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). 
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categories, a court will inquire into whether the law that restricts 
such speech is substantially overbroad.31  
 
2. Conduct and Speech 
 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. O’Brien32 has 
set the standard for courts that review regulations that impact 
speech for reasons unrelated to the content of expression.33 In 
applying O’Brien, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument 
that conduct could be interpreted as speech whenever the conduct 
is intended to convey a message.34 First Amendment protection 
does extend, however, to conduct that is “inherently 
expressive”35—such as flag burning, which does not require 
accompanying speech to explain the message.36 
 
3. Captive Audience 
 
In public spaces—generally, most places outside of the 
home—the burden is on the viewer to avert her eyes from 
offensive protected speech.37 For example, in Erzonik v. 
Jacksonville,38 the Supreme Court struck down as facially invalid a 
regulation prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from displaying 
nudity on screens that were viewable to the public from sidewalks. 
This principle applies to billboard advertisements as well.39 The 
rationale for this doctrine is that in a society committed to 
individual freedom, a certain amount of “expressive disorder” must 
be protected to ensure that a free society will continue.40 
31 SCHWARTZ & RINGHAND, supra note 19. 
32 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
33 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 24, § 9:1. 
34 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 
47, 65-66 (2006). 
35 Id.  
36 Id. (distinguishing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)).  
37 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19, at 948 
(2d ed. 1988). 
38 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
39 See, e.g., New York Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.2d 123 (2d 
Cir. 1998).  
40 City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 472 (1987).  
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4. Public and Private Speech 
  
Another important consideration is the distinction between 
public and private speech.41 Decades ago, Alexander Meiklejohn 
argued that absolute freedom of speech should apply only to 
matters relating to self-governance because such speech is directed 
at the common good.42 By contrast, speech conveyed for 
individual benefit should not necessarily enjoy the absolute 
protections of the First Amendment.43  
 
5. Facial and As-Applied Challenges 
 
To avoid a chilling effect upon speech, courts have invalidated 
laws held to be overly broad.44 A statute may be overbroad on its 
face if there are a substantial number of applications that are 
unconstitutional as judged in relation to the statute’s legitimate 
purpose.45 In essence, a facial overbreadth challenge is a forward-
looking argument that seeks to prevent enforcement of the statute 
in the future. Facial challenges are disfavored because they rest on 
mere predictions and run counter to the theory of judicial 
restraint.46  
By contrast, an “as-applied” challenge seeks only to redress a 
specific constitutional violation. Accordingly, an as-applied 
challenge is appropriate when a person’s constitutional rights have 
been violated by the enforcement of a facially constitutional law or 
regulation. As a practical matter, it may be expedient to first argue  
 
41 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 94 (1948). 
42 Id. at 88-89. 
43 Id. 
44 The “‘overbreadth doctrine’ is derived in part from the elemental 
proposition that ‘a litigant has always had the right to be judged in accordance 
with a constitutionally valid rule of law.’” 1 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 24, 
§ 6.4 (quoting Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (1981)). 
45 See, e.g., Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican 
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008). 
46 See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) (“The delicate power 
of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with 
reference to hypothetical cases thus imagined.”). 
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facial overbreadth and then raise an as-applied challenge in the 
alternative.  
 
II. EXAMPLES OF RECENT OVERBREADTH CHALLENGES 
 INVOLVING TWITTER 
 
Heightened scrutiny, in its various forms, operates to ensure 
that if speech is to be restricted based on its content, such 
restrictions are narrowly tailored to restrict only unprotected 
speech.47 Courts demand that laws restricting speech refrain from 
unnecessarily proscribing protected speech48 because “[p]recision 
of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching 
our most precious freedoms.”49 Courts have insisted that this 
rationale applies not only to traditional forms of expression, but to 
Internet communication as well.50 Thus, the constitutional 
protections available to other forms of communication are also 
applicable to Twitter. 
Because § 2261A may be construed as a content-based 
restriction on speech insofar as the statute acts to limit persons 
from broadcasting harassing expression, a solid defense should 
begin with an argument that the statute is subject to heightened 
scrutiny. A court may hold the statute unconstitutional if it is not 
narrowly tailored to restrict only unprotected speech. Alternately, 
the court may invalidate the statute as applied to the defendant if 
the defense can show that its application violated the defendant’s 
constitutional right to free speech. 
 
A. Cassidy and Sayer 
 
Two recent cases demonstrate the divergent results of 
overbreadth attacks. The first case, United States v. Cassidy,51 
47 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 24, § 2:66 . 
48 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). 
49 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
50 See, e.g., United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 582 (D. Md. 
2011) (quoting in part Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)) (“Online 
speech is equally protected under the First Amendment as there is ‘no basis for 
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied’ to 
online speech.”). 
51 Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011). 
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demonstrates a successful overbreadth attack. The second, United 
States v. Sayer,52 illustrates an unsuccessful attempt. 
 
1. Cassidy: A Successful Overbreadth Argument 
 
In 2011, the District Court of Maryland, in United States v. 
Cassidy, granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that 
§2261A, as applied to the defendant, criminalized protected 
speech.53  
According to an affidavit submitted to the district court: the 
defendant (“Cassidy”), under an assumed name, befriended a 
female Buddhist leader named Alyce Zeoli (“A.Z.”) at her 
Buddhist retreat.54 Cassidy received end-of-life care from the 
Buddhist monks who were led to believe that he was succumbing 
to stage IV lung cancer.55 Cassidy proposed to A.Z. and was 
rebuffed.56 He also asked A.Z. “if she wanted him to kill her ex-
husband,” in response to which “A.Z. requested that her ex-
husband not be harmed.”57 When A.Z. discovered that Cassidy was 
not in fact suffering from terminal cancer, she confronted him.58 
Subsequently, Cassidy left the retreat with a Buddhist nun.59 He 
then set up a fake Twitter account titled “Vajragul” through which 
he directed over 350 tweets at A.Z. and her center.60  
Cassidy contended, inter alia, that § 2261A(2)(A)61 “violates 
52 Nos. 2:11-CR-113-DBH, 2:11-CR-47-DBH, 2012 WL 1714746 (D. Me. 
May 15, 2012). 
53 Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 578 (“an enthroned tulku or reincarnate 
master who was enthroned in 1988 as a reincarnate llama. .  . the only 
American-born female tulku”); see also MARTHA SHERRILL, THE BUDDHA FROM 
BROOKLYN (Random House 1st ed., 2000). 
54 Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 578. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 579 n.6. 
61 Which, again, makes it a crime “to kill, injure, harass, or place under 
surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial 
emotional distress to a person in another State or tribal jurisdiction or within the 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Pub. L. No. 
109-62, § 114(a), 119 Stat. 2690, 2987 (2006). 
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the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because it is 
overbroad and implicates a broad range of otherwise 
constitutionally protected speech.”62  
The government argued that § 2261A regulates conduct and 
not speech.63 The court dismissed the government’s argument, 
citing United States v. O’Brien64 for the proposition that even 
content-neutral laws that proscribe a combination of speech and 
conduct must still survive intermediate scrutiny.65 Such a 
restriction survives intermediate scrutiny if (1) it furthers an 
important governmental interest, (2) such an interest is unrelated to 
restricting speech, and (3) the restriction is no greater than 
necessary to further such an interest.66  
The Cassidy court conceded that preventing tweets and blog 
posts from inflicting emotional distress serves an important 
interest; however, the court questioned whether such an interest 
persists when the expression is conveyed in a public forum. The 
tweets were not directed at a captive audience because the victims 
may choose to ignore the blog posts or “unfollow” the offending 
Twitter accounts.67  
The court noted too that emotionally distressing speech enjoys 
constitutional protection when it touches upon political, religious, 
or other matters of public concern.68 “This is because ‘in public 
debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even 
outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to 
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.’”69  
The court reasoned that the defendant’s tweets did not fall 
within any of the exceptions to First Amendment protection.70 The 
tweets were not integral to criminal conduct because they directly 
related to a public figure; they challenged her efficacy as a 
religious leader; and such speech—uncomfortable, anonymous, 
62 Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 581. 
63 Id. at 585. 
64 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  
65 Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 585. 
66 Id. (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377) (omitting the first factor that the 
O’Brien opinion listed). 
67 Id. at 585-86 n.13. 
68 Id., at 582. 
69 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
70 Id. at 583. 
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Internet speech addressing religious matters—is protected by the 
First Amendment.71 Nor were the tweets “true threats,” because 
the government’s indictment failed to allege that the defendant had 
threatened to inflict death or serious bodily harm.72  
The court held that § 2261A(2)(A) “sweeps in the type of 
expression that the Supreme Court has consistently tried to 
protect.”73 Because the court concluded that the statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to the defendant, it refrained from 
determining whether § 2261A was invalid on its face.74  
  
2. Sayer: An Unsuccessful Overbreadth Argument 
 
In 2012, the District Court of Maine, in United States v. Sayer, 
faced a similar challenge to the interstate stalking statute.75 In 
Sayer, the defendant mounted an unsuccessful challenge to § 
2261A. Of particular importance to this Article, the defendant’s 
overbreadth argument failed.76  
The defendant (“Sayer”) was charged, inter alia, with violating 
the interstate stalking statute because of alleged conduct that was 
intended to “injure, harass, and cause substantial emotional distress 
to a person in another state . . . .”77 After his ex-girlfriend moved 
out of state, Sayer allegedly used her name and personal 
information in creating Internet advertisements and fake social 
media accounts.78 The advertisements implored men to visit the 
victim for sex.79 The advertisements were given an air of 
authenticity by the defendant’s inclusion of sexual home videos he 
had recorded of himself and the victim when they were dating.80 
As a result of the defendant’s actions, a number of strangers 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 586 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964); 
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)). 
74 Id. at 587. 
75 Nos. 2:11-CR-113-DBH, 2:11-CR-47-DBH, 2012 WL 1714746 (D. Me. 
May 15, 2012). 
76 Id. at *6–7. 
77 Id. at *1. 
78 Id. at *2. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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presented themselves at the victim’s door seeking sexual 
intercourse, causing the victim terror and fear that she would be 
raped.81 
The court explicitly distinguished Cassidy for its emphasis on 
the public, religious nature of the tweets: “In Cassidy, the victim 
was ‘not merely a private individual but rather an easily 
identifiable public figure that leads a religious sect, and . . . many 
of the Defendant’s statements relate to [the sect’s] beliefs and [the 
victim]’s qualifications as a leader.’”82 In contrast, Sayer’s alleged 
conduct lacked the protective cloak of political or religious 
speech.83 Moreover, because Sayer’s speech was “integral to 
criminal conduct,” the statute that criminalized such speech was 
not unconstitutional as applied to him.84 
With respect to the facial overbreadth challenge, the court 
explained that the first task must be to construe the statute in 
question. The second task is to determine whether the statute 
reaches too much protected speech.85  
After considering the text of § 2261A, the Sayer court 
explained that the Supreme Court’s test for whether a statute 
criminalizes a substantial amount of protected communicative 
activity is based upon whether the statute, as applied to a number 
of cases, reaches valid conduct more often than is necessary in 
light of its legitimate purpose.86  
 In applying this test, the Sayer court concluded that 
§2261A covered constitutionally unprotected conduct and speech.87 
The court noted that if the statute contained any overbreadth, such 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at *3 (alterations in original) (quoting Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 
586). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008)). 
86 Id. at *5 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010)). 
87 Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 378-79 (2004) 
(“We fail to see how a law that prohibits interstate travel with the intent to kill, 
injure, harass or intimidate has a substantial sweep of constitutionally protected 
conduct. The same is true with respect to the prohibition of intentionally using 
the [I]nternet in a course of conduct that places a person in reasonable fear of 
death or seriously bodily injury. It is difficult to imagine what constitutionally-
protected political or religious speech would fall under these statutory 
prohibitions.”) (citations omitted)). 
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overbreadth was in criminalizing criminal conduct intended to 
cause substantial emotional distress.88 The court conceded that 
such overbreadth, if any, is modest, not substantial, and that the 
specific intent requirement of § 2261A will “dispose of most 
concerns.”89 The court also reasoned that the substantial emotional 
distress precondition narrowed the statute’s application further.90  
 Finally, the Sayer court reiterated that fears of a chilling 
effect upon protected speech should attenuate when behavior shifts 
“from pure speech toward conduct.”91 “Rarely, if ever, will an 
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is 
not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily 
associated with speech (such as picketing or demonstrating).”92 In 
the Sayer court’s opinion, no one familiar with the facts of the case 
could reasonably believe that the Constitution forecloses Congress 
from criminalizing such conduct.93 
 
B. A Difficult Task 
 
A defense that includes an overbreadth challenge to the federal 
cyberstalking statute must show that the statute is more than 
merely overbroad; legislation, to be invalid here, must be 
substantially overbroad compared to the legitimate functions it 
proposes to serve.94  
A facial challenge is unlikely to succeed. The Supreme Court 
has established this stringent threshold showing in part because it 
deemed that any chilling effect upon speech, alone, should be 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at *6. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. at *7 (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124 (2003)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
92 Id. (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
93 Id. 
94 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 24, § 6:6 (citing Broaderick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1970)); see also Gibson v. Mayor of City of 
Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 228 (3d Cir. 2004) (“substantial overbreadth is 
determined first by comparing the number of valid applications to the likelihood 
and frequency of impermissible applications.”). 
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insufficient to prohibit state action.95  
Instead, under this framework, a court must compare legitimate 
and illegitimate applications of the law.96 Accordingly, the 
overbreadth doctrine loses power when the statute in question 
forbids otherwise unprotected speech that the state has deemed 
criminal conduct.97  
In Cassidy, the court held that the defendant’s tweets and blog 
posts were speech addressing an issue of public concern—
regardless of their threatening nature. The United States argued 
that Cassidy’s allegedly threatening tweets comprised a course of 
criminal conduct. But in order to establish its burden of proof, the 
government must show that the expression at issue constituted a 
“true threat” or was “integral to criminal conduct.”   
Notwithstanding this requirement, Sayer suggests that statutes 
that criminalize true threats through the Internet are apt to be 
upheld regardless of any constitutional challenge.98 The 
practitioner therefore must persuade the court that the defendant’s 
speech failed to constitute a true threat. In the Ninth Circuit, this 
task involves distinguishing the defendant’s speech from clear and 
unambiguous threatening statements.99 Thus, two scholars have 
concluded, “[a] recurring theme in all of these cases is the 
heightened willingness of courts to find that statements made on 
the Internet are not protected when fiery rhetoric is conjoined with 
specific identifying or instructional detail.”100 One can understand 
further why the defendant’s actions in Sayer were not afforded the  
 
First Amendment protection—by disclosing the victim’s personal 
information, Sayer all but led strangers to the victim’s door. 
 
95 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 24, § 6:6 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 
U.S. 37 (1971)). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. (citing Broaderick, 413 U.S. at 615). 
98 See, e.g., United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(upholding a conviction against a computer technician for uttering true threats 
through his website). 
99 Id. 
100 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10:42 (emphasis in original). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
An attorney should consider the conduct prohibited by the 
cyberstalking statute. Even if the court considers the restriction to 
be content-neutral—or if the conduct falls within a narrow class of 
unprotected speech—intermediate scrutiny should be applied.  
The United States must, at the very least, show that (1) the 
restriction furthers an important governmental interest, (2) said 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech, 
and (3) that any restriction on speech is no greater than necessary 
to further such an interest.  
Finally, a defense attorney representing a person accused of 
violating the federal cyberstalking statute must persuade the court 
that the defendant’s speech is protected: that it is public, political, 
or religious in nature; fails to comprise a true threat; and is not 
integral to criminal conduct. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
When raising a First Amendment defense to a federal 
cyberstalking charge: 
 
 Emphasize that traditional First Amendment jurisprudence 
applies even if the defendant utilized Twitter. 
 Formulate a tightly constructed argument that the statute 
criminalizes protected speech. 
 Persuade the court that the statute is unconstitutional as 
applied to the defendant. 
 Compare and contrast the legitimate and illegitimate sweep 
of the statute to show that it is substantially overbroad on 
its face. 
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